Avoid relying on a thread sleep to wait for the nodes to connect.
Instead rely on the connection condition being established by using a polling loop.
The loop is controlled by a number of iterations, panicking if the
number of iterations is exceeded.
Addresses intermittent failures in the `test_connection_crossing` e2e test,
which were particularly prevalent on slower CI environments (such as
`rust:trixie`).
Previously, the test spawned two threads to make Alice and Bob dial each
other concurrently and strictly asserted that the "preferred" peer (the
one with the higher Node ID) would always win the `Outbound` link direction.
However, this assumption is flawed in real-world, OS-level network execution
due to two race conditions:
1. Thread Scheduling: One thread could execute and fully establish a
connection before the other thread even began processing its dial command.
2. Reactor Event Ordering: A node's reactor might wake up and process an
incoming TCP connection from its peer *before* it processes the `Connect`
command sent by the test. When it finally processes the `Connect` command,
it sees a session already exists and skips dialing entirely.
In both scenarios, a true "simultaneous crossing" never occurs. Instead, a
standard sequential connection happens, meaning the link direction is dictated
by whoever dialed first, not by the "preferred" peer logic. This caused the
strict `left: Outbound, right: Inbound` assertions to panic.
To fix this, two changes were made:
- Introduced a `std::sync::Barrier` to synchronize the two test threads.
This forces both threads to wait for each other before calling `.connect()`,
maximizing the probability of a true simultaneous dial.
- Relaxed the final assertions. Because OS-level TCP handshakes and reactor
polling can never guarantee perfect simultaneity, we no longer assert
*which* peer gets the `Outbound` link. Instead, we assert the core invariant:
that exactly one connection is established between the nodes, and that their
link directions are opposite (`s1.link != s2.link`).
Two tests assumed that `refs/remotes/rad/HEAD` would automatically be
crated. It turns out, however, that this only the case if executed
with Git 2.48.0 or newer. Git versions older than 2.48.0 do not touch
'refs/remotes/<remote>/HEAD'.
Git 2.48.0 and newer will update `refs/remotes/<remote>/HEAD` by
default. This can be disabled by setting
`remote.<remote>.followRemoteHEAD` to "never". Thus, with these
versions, setting that configuration to "never" emulates the behaviour
of older versions.
Therefore, to ensure that test results are consistent across Git
versions before and after 2.48.0, the fixture of test repositories
now include setting 'remote.rad.followRemoteHEAD = never'.
The affected tests are adjusted accordingly.
This change can possibly be reverted once Radicle requires usage of Git
2.48.0 or newer.
Co-authored-by: Lorenz Leutgeb <lorenz.leutgeb@radicle.xyz>
Do it by setting the environment variable 'CARGO_CMD' when running
'just', or by overriding the justfile variable 'cargo_cmd', like so:
CARGO_CMD='cargo --locked' just ...
or:
just cargo_cmd='cargo --locked' ...
Multiple commands take an RID as a command line argument. However, the
handling, which usually involves falling back to detection of the
repository associated with the current directory, is duplicated many
times over.
Introduce `fn rid_or_cwd` which can be used by many commands.
Many commands take RIDs as arguments. Most of them call the
corresponding struct member `repo`, some call it `rid`.
For consistency, name these members `repo` for all commands.
This change is intended to be invisible to the user. That is why,
in some cases, the "long" version of the argument must be renamed to
match `--rid`.
Copies the template script into the git hooks DIR to prevent a potential
attacker overwriting its contents. Also introduces a check before
running the hook against sensitive files from `master`, if there are
changes between the branch and `master`, asks user to confirm
continuation of hook execution.
The main change that needs adjustment on our side is that
`impl EcPk for ec25519::PublicKey` changed from `Compressed = [u8; 32]`
to `Compressed = amplify::Bytes32`.
Also remove `impl Deref for PublicKey` to avoid dependents of
`radicle-crypto` depend on a particular implementation, and make the
anonymous member private.
See
<f42396139a>.