Introduces a new COB type to store repository identity documents.
The reason for this change is to:
1. Simplify the code, as the identity document logic resembled a COB,
yet it had custom logic. This allows existing COB code to be used for
identities.
2. Make identity document update logic more flexible, since COB actions
can be added in the future.
3. Re-purpose existing tools around COBs to work on identities, eg. `rad
cob`.
4. Unify the concept of an identity change proposal, with regular identity
changes. This means we can remove the `id.proposal` COB in favor of
using the `id` COB itself.
Notes
-----
* Each repository has one Identity COB.
* The `Proposal` COB has been repurposed into the `Identity` COB.
* Identity documents are stored as *embeds* inside the Identity COB
actions.
* The action that contains new document versions is called `revision`,
just like the Patches COB.
* The namespaced `rad/id` ref is a symbolic reference to that Identity
COB.
* The canonical `rad/id` ref is a direct reference to the commit in the
Identity COB that contains the latest *accepted* revision of the
document.
* All commands for managing identities have been folded into `rad id`.
Hence `rad delegate` and `rad edit` are removed.
* The concept of "rebasing" an identity document is gone.
* The `rad id` output has been updated to match the style of other
commands.
* When a revision has enough signatures, it is automatically adopted as
the current identity, there is no longer the need for a "commit"
action.
* When an identity revision is proposed, and the current identity has a
threshold of `1`, that identity is automatically accepted due to the
above point.
* The idea of "verifying a peer's identity branch" no longer applies, as
COBs cannot be verified one history at a time.
* Since the root commit of the Identity COB does not have a "Resource"
to point to (it would have to point to itself, which is impossible),
we've made the resource id optional for COBs.
We employ a better algorithm for determining which commit should be
canonical when there are multiple possible options.
The algorithm still doesn't work in certain cases when there are
multiple merge commits as candidates, with shared parents.
We leave some (ignored) failing tests to be resolved in the future.
Private repos are implemented by extending the identity document with a
`visibility` attribute, that can either be `"public"` (default) or
`"private"`.
In case of `private` visibility, only the delegates are allowed to view
the repo, as well as any DIDs added to the allow list.
To implement repo visibility, we simply block fetches from and
announcements to peers for whom the repo should remain invisible.
Private repos are also not announced in the `inventory` message, since
the full list of peers that *may* have the repo is retrievable from the
repo identity. This could cause errors if eg. a peer who is allowed to
view the repo doesn't actually have it. However this is an ok trade-off
for now to keep the complexity low. For repos to truly be private, it's
important that the RIDs don't leak either.
Finally, we modify `radicle-httpd` for now to only list public repos.
Eventually, we would want to change this depending on whether an allowed
peer is authenticated with the service or not.
---
It's also worth mentioning why this approach was taken, vs. end-to-end
encryption. The reasons are as follows:
1. Nodes that do not have access to a private repo will generally not want to
replicate encrypted data that they cannot examine or use.
2. The chosen solution is trivial, while encrypting git objects isn't.
3. Performance of the chosen solution is much better, there is no
overhead.
4. Privacy of the chosen solution is better: RIDs are never leaked, and
neither is the existence of a private repo, nor who has access to it.
There is one downside: Paying for storage of private repos is no better
in terms of privacy than what GitHub offers. Hosting providers will have
access to your private repos, if this solution is used.
Before this change, the identity document would be loaded for the
COB signer. This meant that a fork would be needed for that signer.
After this change, it's no longer necessary, since the identity doc
head is computed from available remotes.
While making those changes, it was also apparent that some of the
identity-related functions had bad names and error types, this
was fixed as well.
Rust 1.67 was announced[0]. Update the necessary files for running
1.67 and fix the clippy suggestions for string interpolation.
[0]: https://blog.rust-lang.org/2023/01/26/Rust-1.67.0.html
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
Adds a `rad delegate` CLI command.
The command consists of three subcommands:
* `add` -- add a new delegate to the set of delegates of a project
* `remove` -- remove an existing delegate from the set of delegates of a
project
* `list` -- list the delegates of a project
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
To ensure that signatures are unique for verifying an identity a
HashMap is used in place of a Vec of tuples.
This prevents any double counting for quorum checks.
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
The `validate` method of `Project` was unused, which is problematic if
the attributes are supposed to be validated based on some
constraints. The issue is that `Project` provided public construction
of its fields with enforcing validation.
This change makes `Project`'s attributes private and introduces a
smart constructor `new` which is fallible if any of the constraints
are not met. The error type was changed to be a vector of errors since
all of these errors can be collected for better error reporting.
Deserialization also provided a way of constructing a `Project`
without ensuring any of the constraints were checked. To prevent this
a hand-rolled `Deserialize` is provided that goes through
`Project::new`.
To access the fields of `Project`, accessor functions are added and
all call sites are updated to use them.
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
In RIP-2, we specify that identity document root commits must include
the signature of all founding delegates.
This commit adds the required signatures during document creation
and verifies them on load.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Sellier <alexis@radicle.xyz>
The new hierarchy should be much more correct, and cleaner:
* `identity` (`Identity`)
* `identity::did` (`Did`)
* `identity::doc` (`Doc`, `Payload`)
* `identity::doc::id` (`Id`)
* `identity::project` (`Project`)
Signed-off-by: Alexis Sellier <alexis@radicle.xyz>
We are working on other mechanisms to help identify keys, and this
is just redundant.
Also update some of the CLI examples to create a canonical example
for documentation.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Sellier <alexis@radicle.xyz>
The latter is a fork of the former, which adds const generics
and a bunch of other quality of life improvements that aren't
in the original crate due to it being unmaintained.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Sellier <alexis@radicle.xyz>
We weren't including the *multicodec* bytes previously.
This is now tested against some test vectors from the spec.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Sellier <alexis@radicle.xyz>
cloudhead
Alexis Sellier
Fintan Halpenny
Alexis Sellier