The motivation of this change is to move away from tying signing to be
specifically for ed25519. The reason being that the protocol will want move
towards two different kinds of signing – the node signing artifacts, and an
author signing artifacts.
This change captures the former, node signing, by introducing a `Device` type
that is the `NodeId` – a PublicKey underneath the hood – and a signing
mechanism. This allows the replacement of the `Signer` trait being used – which
always assumed a `PublicKey`. Instead, the `Device` is constructed with
`NodeId`.
In `radicle-cob`, a signer is expected to implement
`signature::Signer<ExtendedSignature>`, and everywhere in `radicle`,
`radicle-node`, `radicle-cli`, and `radicle-remote-helper` is expected the
signer is expected to implement `signature::Signer<Signature>`.
A `Device` implements both of these but only requires
`signature::Signer<Signature>` to do so – since an `ExtendedSignature` is
essentially `(PublicKey, Signature)`, and the `NodeId` of the `Device` can be
used.
This change introduces versioning to the identity document format.
The `Version` type is introduced to capture this. Importantly, it is very
restricted in its construction and API. `Version::new` provides a smart
constructor to ensure that it is only ever constructed within the expected
bounds of `0 < v <= IDENTITY_VERSION`, where `IDENTITY_VERSION` is the constant
for the current version.
Note that serializing of the `Doc::version` is skipped to preserve the `Oid`
outputs of all the tests – which means that the first `version` is always
implicit and is not really expected to exist in the serialized forms of the
identity document.
The aim of this change is to make the `Doc` type more safe to use by approaching
the design via [Parse don't validate][[0]] approach.
The problem with the previous approach was that all field were `pub` and thus a
`Doc<Verified>` could easily be mutated and serialized. Granted, the code that
used the serialization would tend to verify the `Doc` first, however, this
approach *ensures* that only a verified `Doc` can be serialized. It also meant
that trying to add new data that would follow the parse approach would require
more generic parameters on top of the existing `PhantomData` parameter, i.e. we
need to do something like: `Doc<RawField, V> -> Doc<ValidField, V>`.
The new approach splits the type into two separate types: `RawDoc` and `Doc`.
The former is allowed to be mutated at will, and uses types that are less
strict. The latter is the valid type that can only be constructed by validating
a `RawDoc` (or the `initial` constructor). The `Doc` type's fields can then only
be accessed by read-only methods.
Solves the problems above by only allowing mutations to `RawDoc`, as well as,
new fields being added to `RawDoc` which are then validated via
`RawDoc::verified`.
[0]: https://lexi-lambda.github.io/blog/2019/11/05/parse-don-t-validate/
The command now works with both a replica target *and* a seeds target.
This is especially useful to eg. ensure that a preferred seed has been
synced, while still trying to hit a higher replica count.
The fetch V2 improvements introduced a `UserInfo` type that is used to
set the Git config's name and email when cloning a repository. This
`UserInfo` can also be used when creating a new `Repository`.
The `Storage` type now takes a `UserInfo` so that it can be passed to
`Repository::create`, for creating a new repository.
For testing, this requires adding a new `fixtures::user` so that
testing `Storage` instances can be easily constructed.
It also means that the `radicle-cli` tests all changed with new SHAs
since the name and email are used as part of the hashing input.
N.b. the order of the timelines while testing the identity cob
changed. It's not clear why that is.
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
Introduces a new COB type to store repository identity documents.
The reason for this change is to:
1. Simplify the code, as the identity document logic resembled a COB,
yet it had custom logic. This allows existing COB code to be used for
identities.
2. Make identity document update logic more flexible, since COB actions
can be added in the future.
3. Re-purpose existing tools around COBs to work on identities, eg. `rad
cob`.
4. Unify the concept of an identity change proposal, with regular identity
changes. This means we can remove the `id.proposal` COB in favor of
using the `id` COB itself.
Notes
-----
* Each repository has one Identity COB.
* The `Proposal` COB has been repurposed into the `Identity` COB.
* Identity documents are stored as *embeds* inside the Identity COB
actions.
* The action that contains new document versions is called `revision`,
just like the Patches COB.
* The namespaced `rad/id` ref is a symbolic reference to that Identity
COB.
* The canonical `rad/id` ref is a direct reference to the commit in the
Identity COB that contains the latest *accepted* revision of the
document.
* All commands for managing identities have been folded into `rad id`.
Hence `rad delegate` and `rad edit` are removed.
* The concept of "rebasing" an identity document is gone.
* The `rad id` output has been updated to match the style of other
commands.
* When a revision has enough signatures, it is automatically adopted as
the current identity, there is no longer the need for a "commit"
action.
* When an identity revision is proposed, and the current identity has a
threshold of `1`, that identity is automatically accepted due to the
above point.
* The idea of "verifying a peer's identity branch" no longer applies, as
COBs cannot be verified one history at a time.
* Since the root commit of the Identity COB does not have a "Resource"
to point to (it would have to point to itself, which is impossible),
we've made the resource id optional for COBs.
Private repos are implemented by extending the identity document with a
`visibility` attribute, that can either be `"public"` (default) or
`"private"`.
In case of `private` visibility, only the delegates are allowed to view
the repo, as well as any DIDs added to the allow list.
To implement repo visibility, we simply block fetches from and
announcements to peers for whom the repo should remain invisible.
Private repos are also not announced in the `inventory` message, since
the full list of peers that *may* have the repo is retrievable from the
repo identity. This could cause errors if eg. a peer who is allowed to
view the repo doesn't actually have it. However this is an ok trade-off
for now to keep the complexity low. For repos to truly be private, it's
important that the RIDs don't leak either.
Finally, we modify `radicle-httpd` for now to only list public repos.
Eventually, we would want to change this depending on whether an allowed
peer is authenticated with the service or not.
---
It's also worth mentioning why this approach was taken, vs. end-to-end
encryption. The reasons are as follows:
1. Nodes that do not have access to a private repo will generally not want to
replicate encrypted data that they cannot examine or use.
2. The chosen solution is trivial, while encrypting git objects isn't.
3. Performance of the chosen solution is much better, there is no
overhead.
4. Privacy of the chosen solution is better: RIDs are never leaked, and
neither is the existence of a private repo, nor who has access to it.
There is one downside: Paying for storage of private repos is no better
in terms of privacy than what GitHub offers. Hosting providers will have
access to your private repos, if this solution is used.
When a merge is applied to a patch, we check whether the threshold
of delegates has been reached, at which point we set the patch status
to `merged`.
This requires threading the identity document oid through the "apply"
process.
Introduce a canonical reference for refs/rad/id to aid in discovering
information about a repository without knowing a peer -- e.g. if a
peer wants to clone a new repository it needs to find out which peers
are delegates for that project, but does not know what their NIDs are
up front.
The approach mirrors the canonical `head` for a repository and
introduces useful constructors for `Doc`/`DocAt`.
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
The MockStorage holds an inventory of repositories and their
identities but when asking for a MockRepository, none of this
information is transferred.
Add `id` and `doc` fields to MockRepository for defining some of its
functionality.
In addition, add a generator for a nonempty MockStorage to use in
tests that will expect the storage to be populated.
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
The olpc-json crate's CanonicalFormatter does not escape certain
control characters, including new lines. This means that when a COB
gets serialized that includes new lines, those new lines are
serialized verbatim. Upon deserialization `serde_json` -- and any
other JSON deserializer -- will fail due to the encounter of these
control characters.
This behaviour was prevented in radicle-link with the definition of
its own CanoncialFormatter that encodes the control characters
correctly.
Inline this definition of the formatter, under MIT license, to ensure
the correct and remove oplc-cjson.
The behaviour is checked using a multiline test in the issue COB.
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
`Doc::commit` used `git2::Signature::now` when committing the document
to the repository. This results in the commits always changing and not
allowing us to test outputs of our CLI commands that would wish to
output the SHA.
Make `Doc::commit` reproducible in debug mode using `debug_assertions`
and checking the `RAD_COMMIT_TIME` environment variable.
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
The signatures for Radicle identities were using the documents
content.
It is standard to use the hash of the content instead, since signing
and verification is faster on a smaller set of data.
Use the resulting Git blob's object id, i.e. `git hash-object`, as the
signing and verifying payload.
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
Adds a `rad delegate` CLI command.
The command consists of three subcommands:
* `add` -- add a new delegate to the set of delegates of a project
* `remove` -- remove an existing delegate from the set of delegates of a
project
* `list` -- list the delegates of a project
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
To ensure that signatures are unique for verifying an identity a
HashMap is used in place of a Vec of tuples.
This prevents any double counting for quorum checks.
Signed-off-by: Fintan Halpenny <fintan.halpenny@gmail.com>
X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett
In RIP-2, we specify that identity document root commits must include
the signature of all founding delegates.
This commit adds the required signatures during document creation
and verifies them on load.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Sellier <alexis@radicle.xyz>
The new hierarchy should be much more correct, and cleaner:
* `identity` (`Identity`)
* `identity::did` (`Did`)
* `identity::doc` (`Doc`, `Payload`)
* `identity::doc::id` (`Id`)
* `identity::project` (`Project`)
Signed-off-by: Alexis Sellier <alexis@radicle.xyz>
Lorenz Leutgeb
Fintan Halpenny
cloudhead
Alexis Sellier
Alexis Sellier