Move logging-related module `radicle::logging` into its own crate.
While at it, remove the "logger" feature flag from `radicle`.
Co-authored-by: Lorenz Leutgeb <lorenz.leutgeb@radicle.dev>
In `cb57e6560fe7767e79b87473a11261fbb82ce84c` the loading of systemd
credentials was refactored. The idea was to only change the accepted IDs
slightly after switching from radicle.xyz to radicle.dev. Unfortunately,
this was done in a sloppy way. The two cases for passphrase and secret
actually differ in ways that was overlooked.
Rectify these mistakes and restore the old behavior:
1. The logic to read the passphrase from the file that contains the
credential is moved out of `load_credential` since it only applies
to the passphrase, not the secret.
2. The warnings printed are now generic, and will not mention the
passphrase in case reading the path for the secret fails.
- Fixes a bug where the log level set in the config file was
ignored: `Logger` and `StderrLogger` captured the level in a
`self.level` field at construction time and checked it in
`Log::enabled`. After config was loaded, the global
`log::set_max_level` was updated but `self.level` was not,
so verbose messages were dropped by the per-instance filter
even when the global filter allowed them.
- Make `log::set_max_level` the single source of truth: remove
the `level` field and have `Log::enabled` defer to
`log::max_level()` so the two filters can no longer drift.
- Update call sites to construct loggers without a level.
- Disable the structured logger's internal filter (set to "trace") so
that it also falls back to `log::set_max_level`.
Because we changed our main domain from radicle.xyz to radicle.dev, we
should also change our systemd credential identifiers.
Handling is move into a new function, which also checks the old names
for backwards compatibility.
The value of `RAD_SOCKET` influences the outcome of `cargo test`.
Users that set this environment variable to, e.g. point `rad` at
a socket at a custom location, were surprised that execution of
tests would interact with their node.
Split `Home::socket` into two functions. `Home::socket_default` is
"pure" and only dependent on the path represented by `Home`. On the
other hand, `Home::socket_from_env` interprets the environment.
Most users will want to use `Home::socket_from_env`.
Evaluate the `warn!` logging in `radicle-node`.
If the event is a result of something being suspicious in the running
of the protocol, then it remains a `warn!`.
However, if the system ends up ignoring the event and can continue
without issues, the log level is reduced to `debug!`.
Instead of changing `impl From<SystemTime> for LocalTime` to `TryFrom`,
the implementation was removed, as there are not many callsites, and
they are well served by `LocalTime::now`.
radicle-localtime: drop TryFrom SystemTime
radicle-node: switch SystemTime usage with LocalTime
While it is possible to pass the passphrase via the environment, e.g.
`EnvironmentFile=<path to file that contains "RAD_PASSPHRASE=…">`
this is less secure than passing it via a file, because the environment
is inherited down the process tree.
Thus, allow using a systemd credential. The ID of the credential must be
xyz.radicle.node.passphrase
and is not user-configurable.
Passing the passphrase via file is now possible with
`LoadCredential=xyz.radicle.node.passphrase:<path to file that contains passphrase>`
This requires just a bit of plumbing in `radicle-node`.
Because this mechanism is more secure than using the environment
variable `RAD_PASSPHRASE`, it takes priority. That is, if both the
systemd credential is available, *and* the environment variable
`RAD_PASSPHRASE` is set, the former is preferred.
Heads-up:
1. The contents of the file must be valid UTF-8 (see documentation of
`std::fs::read_to_string`). Assuming that the passphrase is at some
point chosen by the user and typed on a keyboard, this does not
seem like a severe restriction.
2. The contents of the file are not processed otherwise, i.e. line
breaks (notably at the end of the file) are not stripped.
The related `issue/8bd040e9de05e7fc27e373ebc1649ff4ad930e7a` asked for a
very similar feature: Passing the passphrase via a file named by the
value of the of the environment variable `RAD_PASSPHRASE_FILE`.
It was also briefly discussed at
<https://radicle.zulipchat.com/#narrow/channel/369277-heartwood/topic/.60RAD_PASSPHRASE_FILE.60/with/529104447>.
While it is possible to use systemd credentials via
LoadCredential=xyz.radicle.node.secret:…
ExecStart=radicle-node … --secret "${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY}/xyz.radicle.node.secret"
Make usage more convenient and directly support passing the secret key
via a systemd credential. The ID of the credential must be
xyz.radicle.node.secret
and is not user-configurable.
A systemd service unit file might contain:
LoadCredential=xyz.radicle.node.secret:…
ExecStart=radicle-node …
This requires just a bit of plumbing in `radicle-node`.
The preference order for the path of the secret key is:
1. The command line argument `--secret`.
2. The systemd credential.
3. The configuration file.
4. The default location to preserve backward compatibility.
The reason to prefer the systemd credential over the configuration file
is that it uses a mechanism that is influenced by the environment of the
process, which is deemed "closer at runtime" or "more dynamic" than a
configuration file. Ad-hoc overrides are still possible via the
commandline argument.
With this change, the location of the secret SSH key can be configured
through `${RAD_HOME}/config.json` so that the node key does not have to
be placed under `${RAD_HOME}/keys` anymore.
Further, there is now an option to override `config.json` directly when
executing `radicle-node` via the command line argument
`--secret`.
The primary motivation is more flexible deployments, for example
leveraging external secret management solutions, like
<https://systemd.io/CREDENTIALS/>.
The secret key is fingerprinted by taking the fingerprint of the public
key corresponding to the secret key. This allows to detect when the
secret key changes.
Register a panic handler that logs a backtrace via the `backtrace`
crate, instead of setting `RUST_BACKTRACE`.
Co-authored-by: Lorenz Leutgeb <lorenz.leutgeb@radicle.xy>
Optionally depend on crate `structured-logger`. Allow enabling it via
`--log-logger structured`. For future compatibility, provide
`--log-format` which currently only supports JSON.
Co-authored-by: Lorenz Leutgeb <lorenz.leutgeb@radicle.xyz>
Logging initialization was infallible previously, i.e., a logger would
always have to be chosen, falling back to our own logger
implementation in case of failure with setting up journald submission.
This lead to complexity like attempting to log errors from parsing
arguments, as there is a circular dependency.
Change this to make logging initialization fallible. If it fails, exit
non-zero instead of falling back to another logger. This makes the
initialization code slightly simpler.
At the same time, make choosing the logger possible via the command
line and deprecate `--log`.
Note that we still default to journald if detected.
`anyhow` is only used to capture a handful of errors. It also turns out that
usage of `lexopt` was wrong, since it features `parse_with`, which neatly
integrates with `FromStr`. The types, luckily, implement this trait already –
making for cleaner parsing.
For now, the execution errors are all "transparent", which shouldn't be
much of a regression, if at all.
It turns out that failing to read configuration resulted in no output,
because the logger would only be set after configuration had been read.
Fix this, by setting the logger early, with a log level that is then
corrected as soon as configuration is available.
While at it, also clean this up to allow logging errors about failure to
set up the logger.
The signals crate does not build on non-Unix-like platforms, such as
Windows. It uses constants for signals that are not exported from
`libc` on Windows, and transitive dependencies such as `sem_safe` fail
to compile.
Resolve this, by guarding most of the crate, certainly all real
features, by `cfg(unix)`.
To require less uses of the `cfg` macro, move all affected parts into a
new module, and re-export it.
The crate now builds on Windows (although it does not do anything
interesting on that platform) and its Unix interface remains unchanged.
Changes are integrated into `radicle-node`, but only affect Windows.
Adrian Duke
Lorenz Leutgeb
Daniel Norman
Lorenz Leutgeb
Fintan Halpenny
Sebastian Martinez
Erik Kundt